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STATE

BRO'fHERHOOD OF

F. Xu. li-\00:3.

R R.

In Bank.

C.2d

.)nne :20,

S'l'A'l'E (H' CALIPORNIA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
BIWTHEIUIOOD OF' HAIIJROAD THAINMEN (an
I
DAVID
[1] Statutes-Operation Against State.-Statutes whieh in
terms divest preexisting rights or privileges will not be applied
to a
in the absence of express words to that effeet,
unless there are extraneous and affirmative reasons for believing that the sovereign was intended to he af'f,,cted.
[2] Master and Servant- Statutory Regulation.- Considerations
which may justify application of general safety and taxing
measures to state-owned carriers are not controlling in determining the intended scope of a statute which purport,.; to
regulate and supervise employer-employee relationships.
[3] Statutes- Interpretation- Legislative Intent.
Courts must
look to the subject matter of a particular statute and to the
terms of the enactment in its total environment in order to
determine legislative intent.
[ 4] Public Employees-Applicability of State Laws.~-~W ages, hour·s
and working conditions of government employee~ must be fixed
by statute or ordinance, and state laws which, in general terms,
secure the right of employees to enter into collective bargaining
agreements with respect to those matters are not intended to
apply to public employment.
[5] !d.-Federal Legislation.-In a dual system of government in
which, under the federal Constitution, the states are sovereign,
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress.
[6] Id.- Nature of Employment: Commerce- Regulation.
The
fact that operation of a railroad by the state may be described
as a proprietary activity is immaterial in considering the
characteristics of public employment or the intended scope of
congressional legislation regulating interstate commerce.
[4] See 15 Cal.Jur. 577; 7 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.) 457;
31 Am.Jur. 849.
McK. Dig. References:
Statutes, § 20; [2] lVIaster and Servant, § 4; [3] Statutes, § 126; [4,
10] Publie Employees; [6]
Public Employees: Commerce, § 3;
Labor, § 1.1; [8] Waters,
§ 435(1); [9] State of California,§ 18.
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C.2d 412; 232 P.2d 857]

Labor Act

Labor Act.-The federal
U.S.C.A. § 1;51 et
for collective
to wages and
conditions of railway
not
to a state-owned and operated

l8a, 8b] Waters-Harbors-Harbor Commissioners-Compensation
of Employees.-There is no
between Gov. Code,
~
the
approval of
salaries, and Harb. & Nav. Code,
the Board of State Harbor Commissioners
and the sections should be contogether.
[ 9] State of California-Fiscal Matters.--The purpm;c of legisla·
tion
to the Department of Finance general powers of
supervision over matters coneerning financial and business
of the state
Code, § 13070) is to prevent improvidence, and to control expenditun~ of state money by any
of the departments of the state.
[101 Public Employees-Compensation.-~As~uming that to require
approval of Harbor Board employees' salaries by the Department of J<'inance would be tantamount to transferring to the department the power to "fix" compensation for Harbor Board
employees, Gov. Code, § 18004, must be regarded as modifying
all earlier legislation authorizing specific state agencies to fix
their employees' salaries.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Andrew R. Schottky,
,Judge.
Reversed.
Action for deelaratory relief to determine validity of a
1:ontract. Judgment for defendants declaring contract valid,
reversed.
l<'rrd N. How;;;er, .iltt.orney General, and Herbert E. Wenig.
D1'pntr Attorw'r GPnrral. for Plaintiff and AppPllanL

./amPs H. Phillips for Interv0ner and Appellant.

( 'Jifton Hildebrand for Hespondents.
GIBSO:-.J, C. ,J.-'l'he State of California brought this action
for declaratory relirf to determine the validity of a contraet
entered into by rPspondent brotherhoods and the Board of
*Assigned by Chairman of ,Judicial Council.
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the rates of pay and
of the State Belt Railroad.
vYorking conditions of
in favor of
This appeal \Yas taken from a
ents dt>claring the eontraet valid.
thr statr, and
The Belt Railroad is owned and
its management and eontrol are committed
statute to the
Board of State Harbor Commissioners.
& Nav.
~§ 3150-3165.)
The railroacl parallels the waterfront of San
Francisco harbor, exten<ling to some 4fi wharves and dirP<'t.ly
srning approximately 175 industrial plants, and it has trac;k
or frright-ear ferry ronnectiom; with three interstate railways.
'rhe Belt line facilitates the freight traffic of the l1arbor h.\·
moving freight ears betwern the various steamship ('ompanirs,
industrial plants and railroad earriE'rs with which it haP
eonnE'ctions, and it servrs as a link in the through transportation of interstate freight Rhipped to or from points in San
Francisco over the cmmrcting carriers. It iR settled that
thE' Belt Railroad is engaged in intrrstate rommrrE'e. ( Unifrd
Stafrs Y. State of Califonlia. 297 U.S. 17!) [56 R.Ct. 421. 80
hEel. 567]; State of Cal?"form·a v. Anglim, J29 F.2d 455;
1Jtaurice ,-. State
Califor11ia. 43 Oal.App.2d 270 rno P.2d
7061.)
The railroad employs betwrE'n 125 llnd 225 persons, the
nnm her dept>nding upon the volume of bnshwss. The Constitution of California providrs that these emplo:vt>t>s nrr
mrmberR of the state rivil RE'rvirr, and under the Civil Rrrvier
Aet thr appointmt>nt, elasRifieation. promotion, flalar:v mngeR.
hours and general working E'Omlitions of all mrmhrrR of tbr
riYil serdre art> govrrnE'(l h~- provisions of that act anil h~·
rr!Ynlatiom; of the Rtatr PPrsonnE'l Boaril. { Oal. Oonst .. art.
XXIV. § 4: r.ov. Ooilr. §§ ] 8fi00-l 076fi. I CompenRation of
rmplo:vee« wiH1in thr ranges set hy thr Rtatr Prr::;omwl Board
ma.\" be fixed h~· thr Harbor Boanl (TTarb. & NaY. Co(1r.
~ 1705). ;::ubjPct to npproval h~· thr ;::tatr Dt'partmrnt of
Finaner. (G0Y. Co1lr. ~ 18004.1
On Srptrmbrr 1. 1942. thP Bo;;ml of Statr Harbor Comthe
missionrrs and rrRponilPnt brothE'rlJOods.
railroad employers. enterE'd into thr contract
im·oh·ed.
In Q'enrral, the contract fixe;:; matter;:;
pa~- anr1
IYOt'king conditions whieh arE'
b~· ciYil
srn·iee ;:;tatutes and
and eertain of it;:; proYisions
eonflict in substance with eivil srrvice laws on the subjects
of promotions. lav-offR. 1ravE's of absenee. accumulation of sick
lraYP am1 prm•Pdnrrs for r1ismis>;nl. dE'motion and sns]Wl1Rion.
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The contract
the result of collective
between
respondent brotherhootls and the Harbor Board, and the parties concede that it has IteYer been appron•d
the Department
of l''iuanee.
The state eontends that the coutract is invalid because the
aff,~dcd are melllbers of the state civil serviee and
that their pay aud
couditions are to be governed
exel usi vely
legislation or administrative rules aud not by
<·iJllel'tive bargaining contract. A similar contention is made
the
a Bl'lt Hailroad
who claims that
his benefits aud pri vile.ges are less under the provisions of
the eontrad than under the state Civil Service Aet, and that
lle is entitled to proteetion of the laws governing state employmeHt. 1t is respomleuts' positiou, however, that the state, as
OWllPt' of the Belt Hailroatl, is subjeet to the federal Hailway
J,aboJ· Aet whieh se<:rtl'<'S to employees of railroads engaged
in interstate commerce the right to enter into collective bargaiJJing agreements with their employer concerning rates of
pay, rules and working conditions. ( 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 152.)
Aeeordingly, rt•spondents argue, the eontract is valid and
;;upersedes all provisions of the state Constitution, the Civil
Serviee Aet, and rules and regulations of the State Personnel
Board whieh are inconsistent therewith.
'l'he Hailway l,abor Aet requires all common carriers by
railroacl, tbeit· officers, agents, and employees "to exert every
reasollable dl'm·t to make and maintain agreements eoneerning
t·atPs of pay, rules and vvorking eonditions, and to settle all
disputes, whether rising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in orde1· to avoid any interruption to
eommen,r . . . . " (4G U.S.C.A. § 152.) It provides that employees shall have the right to organize and bargain colleetively
through representatives of their own choosing, and it sets up
a pro(•Hlnre for the settlement of disputes by conference of
repre;;entatiws of employer and employees and, failing solution thPre, by rdPnm('e to the National Railroad Adjustment
Hoard, trw National :Mediation Board, or arbitration. ( 45
!'.S.C ..\. §§ 1:12-1:>5, 157.) Orders of thr National Railroad
Adjustment Board may be enforcPd by action in United States
Distrid Courts, and juc1g·ment may be entered on awards
whieh aJ'P t}H' result of arbitration. (45 U.S.C.A. §§ 153p, 159.)
The aet fixes tl1e pt·oeedure employers must follow in changing 1·ates of pay, rules or working conditions, requiring thirty
days' notice and conference with employee representatives; it
further provides tl1at no sueh changes shall be effective until
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final aetion
ofT('fS its serviem.; or eitlwr
§ 156.) Pnnishment in the form of fines and
pn•seribrd for
who fail to
ad.
U.S.C.A. § 152 tenth.)
[1] The Rail·way Labor Act does not
io
state-owned railroads
C.S.C.A.
151 , and
well
sPttled that statutes which in general terms divest
rights or privileges will not be applied to a
ab:-;enee of expresR words to that
unless there are extraneous and affirmatiw reasons for believing that the soy.
ereign was intended to be affected. (United States v Um'ted
Mine 1Vorke1·s, 330 U.S. 258, 272-273 [67 S.Ct. 677, 686, 706.
91 L.Ed. 884]; United States v. WHtek, 337 U.S. 346, 359
I 69 S.Ct. 1108, 1115, 93 L.Ed. 1406] Parker v. Brown, :317
U.S. 341, 350-351 [63 S.Ct. 307, 313, 87 L.Ed. 3151; Balthasar
v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 187 Cal. 302, 305-306 [202 P. 37,
19 A.hR. 452] ; cf. United States v. State of California, 297
l'.S. 175, 186 [56 S.Ct. 421, 425, 80 L.Ed. 567].) In United
States V. State of California, S11pm, 297 U.S. 175 r56 S.Ct.
421, 80 LEd. 567], which also involved the Belt Railroad.
the Supreme Court found reasons for believing that Congress
intended to include stateR within the operation of the federal
Safety Appliance Act. The court stated that the purpose of
the statute there involved was to protect employees, the publie
and commerce from injury because of defective app1ianees
on interstate carriers and that no convincing reason had been
advanced why it should not apply to all carrier:;;, whether
private or state owned. The Belt Railroad has also been he1(1
subject to the federal Employers' I1iability Act and the fp(leral
Carriers Taxing Act. (2lfa1m:ce v. State of California, 4:1
Ca1.App.2d 270 [110 P.2d 706]; State of Cal1:jornia v. Anr;lim.
129 F.2d 455.) [2] However, considerations \vhich may
justify the appliration of general safety and taxing measnrrs
to state-owned carriers are not controlling in determining tlw
intended scope of a statute which purports to regulate am1
supervise rmployrr-employee relationships. [3] We mnst look
to the subject matter of a particular statute and to the terms
of the enactment in its total environment in order to determine legislative intent, and there are, we believe, affirmative
reasons which indicate that Congress did not intend the Railway I1abor Act to apply to state-owned carriers.
It is most significant that, while one of the major pnrposeR
of the Railway Labor Act i.s to secure the right of employe<•s
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Santa Monica,
Springjleld
542-544 J.) A
concise statement of the characteristics distinguishing public
from
in this
appears in a letter
from President Roosevelt to the National Federation of Federal Employees, dated
1937: "All Government
employees should realize that the process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into
the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable
limitations when applied to public personnel management.
The very nature and purposes of Government make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fuJly or to
bind the employer in mutual discussions with Government
employee organizations. The employer is the whole people,
who speak by means of laws enacted by their representatives
in Congress. Accordingly, administrative officials and employees alih: are governed and guided, and in many instances
restricted, by laws whieh establish policies, procedures, or
rules in personnel matters." (Quoted in C£t11 of Springfield
v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239 [206 S.W.2d 539, 542-5431 ; C.I.O. v.
r?ity of Dallas, (Tex.Civ.App.) 198 S.W.2d 143, 144-145.)
[4] Recent authorities hold uniformly that the wages,
hours and working conditions of government employees must
be fixed by statute or ordinance and that state laws which, in
general terms, secure the right of employees to enter into
colleetive bargaining agreementfl with respect to those matters
are not intended to apply to public employment_! (Nutter v.
rJity of Santa Monica, 74 Ca1.App.2c1292 [168 P.2c1 7411; C1"ty
'It should be notr-d that we are not h0re roneerned with the right of
pnhlie employees to join or form labor orgunizntionR or to urge the
proper exNcise of diseretionnry authorit~·
rxeentin' nnrl ndministrative
officers. (See City
Sprin.fJfteld v. Cim1se,
:\fo. 1230 f206 S.W.:2d C.;i9,
7.42-5431; City of
A. v. LoR An,qe/es etc. Comwil, 04 Cnl.Apv.2rl 36,
4:J r210 P.2d 305]; 1 Tellm·, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining
[ 1040 ed., 1947 Snpp.l ~ 171. p. 113-119; Rhyne. Lahor Unions :md
:\funieipal Employe Law fHJ46 ed.l ~ 1, p. 21-3:1; Rhyne, iil., Supp. Rep.
f1949] § l, p. 8-15: 54 Harv.I~.Rev. 1360 (19411; cf. C.I.O. v. City of
Dallas, (Tex.Civ.App.) 198 S.W.2d 143, H:i-147; SPattle Hiqh School
Chap. No. 200 v. Sharples, Hi9 Wasl1. 424 f2rlil P. !194, 72 A.L.R. 12IG].)
37 C.2d-H

~lo. 123D [206 S.\Y
Miami Water Works Local No. 654
165 A~.L.l1c.
; see
v.
C01mcil
185 ~ld. 266 [44 A.2d
162 A.L.R. 1101] Hagerman v. City
Dayton,
147 Ohio 313
N.E.2d 246, 253,
; 1 'reller, IJabor Disand Collective
1947
The Labor Relations Acts of several states ov""',""
exclude
employees from their provisions
collective bargaining, 2 and it has been held that such
erimination does not constitute a violation of equal protection.
(Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 95 [65 S.Ct. 1483,
1488, 89 L.Ed. 2072] .)
Congress itself has eonsistently excluded state employment
from the operation of other labor relations statutes enacte\l
nnder the commerce or war power. The National Labor Relations Act of 1937 and the subsequent Labor Management
Helations Act of 1947, which secure the right of collective
bal'gaining to employees of employers engaged in interstate
commerce, expressly provide· that the term employer as used
in the aets does not include the United States or any state
or political subdivision. (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141, 152(2).) Th<•
Fair Ijabor Standards Aet of 1938 likewise expressly excludes
governmental employers from its provisions (29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 201, 203d), as does the War Labor Disputes Aet of 1943.
(50 U.S. C.A. §§ 1501, 1502d.) 'rhese statutes indicate a uni
form congressional poliey that the relationship between a statP
and its employees is not to be eontrolled by the federal
g·ovPrnment even where those employees are engaged in interstate commeree, and so closely related in purpose is sueh labor
legislation with the Railway Labor Aet that the Supreme
Court has characterized eolleetive bargaining provisions of
the Railway Act as the "analogue" of similar provisions in
the National Labor Relations Aet and has given parallel interpretation to sertions of the two acts. (National Labor Relatirms Board v. Jones & Laughlin S. Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44-45
!57 S.Ct. 615, 627-628, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 13521.)
1Tnder a11 the cireumstances, it is obvious that application
of the eol1eetive bargaining requirements of the Railwa.v

"Fla., Stat.Ann., rh. 453, ~ 453.17; Mass., Ann. Laws, ch. 150 B ~ 2;
:Vfinn., Stat. Ann. eh. 17!), § 179.01, subd. 3; N.Y., Con~ol. Laws, eh. ilO.
art. 20, § 715; Penn., Stat.Ann., title 43, § 211.3; R.I., Lnws 1 fl41 eh.
1066, § 16; Tex., 15 CiY.Rt., art. fil:i4e; 'Gtah, Code Ann.1fi~:J, 49-1-10
Wis., Stats. 1939, c. fi7.
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Labor
to
would constitute an unprecedentPd interfPrenr:e ·with a state's traditional method of fixing
the
eonditions of its
and it seems doubtful
that
had sueh an intent [5] As stated in Parkrr
. Brou'?l, :117 FS. :141,:151 168 S.Ct. :307,
87 L.l1Jd. :3151,
"fn a dual
of
in whieh, under tlle Con;;titnlion, thA states are
saye
as Congress may
snbtract from their
an
pilrJ!Ilse to nnllii'y a statr. 's control rWAr its offirers and agents
not
to he attributed to Congress.''
'rhr legislatiw· history of the act givrs no indieation that
it was intPndrcl to affrd llH:'\' hut private ellrrien;. Prior to
its; Pnartmrn t in ] ~2fl, Congress bad passed a series of l mYs
rlrsigned to bring about peacefnl settlement of railroad c1ispntrR, hnt 11011r had the fnll support of both the rarrien; and
their employees, and 11rbitration machinery set up under
proYisions of tlJP 1!120 •rransportation .Act had proYrn partienlar]~- inrffertiw. (Srr fl7 C:ong. Rrr. 4509-4513 . .J-516;
T'irqinirm Ry. no.,.. 8ystrm Ji'rdrration No. 40, 300 FS. fi15,
:142 [ G7 S.Ct. 5!12. 007, 81 L.Ed. 78fll ; Texrrs & N.O.H. Co. ,-.
BrotluThood of Ry. & 8.8. Clrrks, 281 U.S. 548, 562-5()3
f!'iO S.Ct. 427. 431, 74 hEeL 10341.) In 1925 representatiyqs
of some 58 major priYate railroads and 20 lAbor organizations
met and Pntereo into prolonged negotiations OYer legislation
whirh wonlrl be satisfartory to all interests. And the Railway
Labor Rill was tllr product of these conferences. (See fl7
(\mg. Rre. 4!504-4fi0fi, 4522. 4524, 4583, 4652. 8807: Tc:ras &
N.O.R. r:o. Y. Rrnfherltood of RJt. cf· 8.8. Clerks, supra, 281
fT.S. !148, ?ifl3 fRO S.Ct. 427. 4:n. 74 T.J.E(L 10341.) Tdentiral
hills f'mhocl,·ing the propo,:;als of the unions and tlle railroads
·n-err introdnr•ed in each Honse of Congress by the chairm;m
of its rommitter 011 intrrstate commerce, and, after pnblir
hearings. the Railway I1ahor Bill was passed witllout r;:nhstantial amrnilmrnt. (Srr fl7 Con;r. Rec. 4504-4505: Cllamh,rlain. Thr Railway Lnbor Aet (1!1261 12 A.B.A .•Tom. 6:3:3.)
Tl111s th0 Rail·wa:- T;llbor Art hasie11l1y represented tllr agrPr!TJrlJt of labor org-anization;:; 'Yitll priYatf~ earriers. We h:wr
hrrn ritrd to no instancr in the rourse of passage of the bill.
and haYe discoyerrd none, in which the (jnrstion w11s rair;:r•d
as to \Yhethrr statr-ownrd railroailR WHE' intenderl to lw
nffer~te'l.

::\Iany of the purposes stated in the Haiiway r~abor Ad a~·e
similar to some of the purposes of the Norris-IJa Guardia Aet
,,-hieh \\·ere diseusscd in United States v. United Mine Workers,
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and designation of
to
negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that
he shall be free from the
or coercion
of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of
such representatives . . . for the purpose of collective bargaining. . . . '' 1'he court then observed, ''These considerations, on their face, obviously do not apply to the government
as an employer or to relations between the Government and
its employees." In a separate concurring opinion ,Justices
Black and Douglas added the following, ''Congress never
in its history provided a program for fixing wages, hours, and
working· eonditions of its employees by eollectivc bargaining.
·working conditions of Government employees had not been
the subject of collective bargaining, nor been settled as a
result of labor disputes. It would require specific congressional language to persuade us that Congress intended to
embark upon such a novel program or to treat the Government
employer-employee relationship as giving rise to a 'labor dispute' in the industrial sense." (330 U.S. at 328-329, 67 S.Ot.
at 713.)
Those provisions of the Railway IJabor Act which fix a
mPthod for the settlement of disputes by conference of employer and employee representatives, and, thereafter, by
reference to federal adjustment or mediation boards or to
arbitration, are equally inappropriate to the relationship behn•Pn a state and its employees. Normally, a state provides
mrtho<~s for the settlement of disputes and grievances of its
Pmplo:w<'s vvithin the framework of its own government, 3 and
a g'PlH'rll] C'ong-rpssionaJ provision for the handling of disputes
hrtwrrn rmployrrs and rmployres would, we think, be in·
tPnc1Pc1 to apply only to private individuals or corporations,
and not to a sovereign state.
[6] We can find no legitimate reason for making any disthwtion in the prrsrnt case between governmental and pro3
The California Civil Service Act provides for investigati011s or hearings
by the State Personnel Board of disputes and other matters arising under
the C'idl Snvicp Art nnd administrntivr ruks. (GoY. Code, §~ H\i\7018681, 18714, 18803, 18851, 19578-19587, 19541, 19576, 19583.5.)
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of

aetivity
2il CaL2d
[178 P.2d
the charaeteristics of public
""o'-'v'""' legislation
v. State
80 L.Ed.
94 Cal.App.2d
Santa JYionica,
ao2 [ J 6b P .2d
see Rhyne, Ijabor
!'niOlJS and
Employe r_~aw [19,16
§ 7, p. 53-56;
id., Snpp.Hep. [ 1949 J § 7, p. 81-82; 1 'l'eller, [,abor
and Colle<:tiYc
[1940
1947 Supp.]
171, pp. 117, 118.)
[7] In vi(•w ot our eo1wlusion that Co11gress did not intend the Hailway Labor Aet to apply to state-owned and
operateu carriers, we need not consider whether Congress
t·ould constitutionally undertake to regulate the relationship
between a state and its employers, and vve likewise need not
determine whether applieation to a state of provisions for
enforeement of orders of the Hailroad Adjustment Board and
arbitration awards in federal courts \vould constitute a violation of the Eleventh AmPmlmrnt to thr fedrral Constitution.
The jnrlgltlent in the JH't•sent easr' must be rPvrrsPCl for
the further reason that, assuming the statr is subjrct to the
Hailway Labor Act am1 t1Hlt stat(~ eiYil service rPgulations
are stqwrsederl b,\'
of that act, the Harbor Board
dmlcl not proprrl\· enter into thr eontraet with the brotherhoods and bind the state without the approYal of the Department of ]'inanee, ns required by srction 18004 of the Govermnent Code. 4 (8a] There is no inconsistrney between
sectiou 18004 and the provision in seetion 1705 of the Harbors
and NaYigation Corle authorizing· the Board of State Harbor
Commissioner,;: to fix the salary of its rmployees. 5 [9] 'rhr
"Section 18004
: "Unless thtJ LegiHlature specifically )lrovides
that appt·oyal of
of Piname is not required, whenever
any State
fixes the salary or compensation of an employee
or officer,
salary is payable in whole or in part ont of State funds,
the salary is subject to the
of the Department of Pinance before
it becomes effective and
" (As added in Hii:J, based on former
Pol. Code, § 67:i.L)
"Section I /0.) proYidPs, ''.
Tht' Bonnl slwll fix 01e compensation of
its officers and employees other than the commissioners . . . , "
(As
amended in 194:1.) Prior to 194:3 the section read as follows: '' . . . 'rlw
salaries of [certain specified officers l shall he fixed by the hoard with
the approval of the Director of Pinance. 'fhe board shall fi.x the eom·
pensation of other employees. . . , ''

4'i')

Fl'rATE

BROTIIERHOon
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IL R.

rtmvni or l•'infllll'(' is
general power::; of
on'r a II nw11 ers
the financial and bm;iness "v'"''"'J'
of tlH• Ntate. (( ;o\·.
~ ] :3010, based on former PoL
~ 634.)
The purpose of f'neh [(•gislation is to conserve the
financial int<'ru,.;ts of the state, to prevent improvidence, ailll
to tontrol the
of ~,;tat(o money
any of tlH•
sevel'al departments of the state.
11
70, 72
P.2d
.) (8b] Since sections
18004 and 170i) may be harmonized,
should be construed
together and with reference to tht~ ·whole system of whieh they
form a part. (See Cohn v.
45 Cal.App. 531, fi:HI-537
[188 P. 2791; Irclancl v. Riley, snpnt, 11 Cal.App.2d 70, 74-76
[52 P.2d 10211 ; Chilson \'. Jerome, 102 Cal.App. 685, 641
[28:3 P. 862[.) [10] Moreover, eyen if we were to aceept the
argument that the reqnirement of approval of salaries by the
Department of F'inance is tantamount to transferriug to the
department the power to ''fix'' eompensation of Harbor Board
l~mployees, the legislahno intent to ereate supervisory powers
in the departrrwnt is so clear and unmistakable that sedion
18004 mu:>t be regarded as modifying all (~arlier legislation
anthorizing spe(·ific; state
to fix the salaries o[ their
('!llployees.
'l'he judgment is reversed.

Shenk, J., Edmonds, .J., Traynor,
Spenee, J., concurred.

.r.,

Schauer, J., and

CARTER, J .-I dissent.
The majority opinion holds that employees of the state
engaged in the operation of the State Belt Railroad, a state
operated carrier engaged in interstate commerce, do not have
the protection afforded by federal Railway Labor Act. ( 45
U.S.C.A. §§ 151-152.) Cnder that act working conditions and
rates of pay are fixed by a collective bargaining agreement
between the employer and the union representing the employees. 'l'he majority holds that it was not intended by
Congress to include the state as a carrier-employer; that the
employees are subject to the state civil service laws, and that
the Board of Harbor Commissioners are authorized to fix the
salary of sueh employees with the approval of the Director of
Finance. That result is reached on the following bases:
( 1) rrhe rule of statutory construction that a statute does
not apply to the goYernment unless it is named; (2) The rates
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conditions of
Congress has ''
excluded the state from labor laws
The history of the
None of those
valid and the conclusion is
determinations on the subto the
State
297 U.S. 175 [56
S.Ct.
, the same Belt Railroad was involved
and the court ·was concerned with the federal Safety Appliance
,\.ct. ( 45 ES.C.A. § 1, et seq.) That act has to do with
standards of
in train equipment. 'fhe particular problem presentcd 'Was whether California was subject to the
provision of the aet for failing to comply with the
safety standard. 'l'he court held that it was, and in so holding,
stated prineiples whieh make it a binding precedent in the
instant case. It found that the Belt r~ine is engaged in
interstate commerce. A unanimous court said: "The state
urges that it is not subject to the federal Safety Appliancr
"\et . . . it is said that as the state is operating the railroad
without profit, for the purpose of facilitating the commerce
of the port, and is using the net proceeds of operation for
harbor improvement, . . . it is engaged in performing a pub1ie function in its sovereign capaeity and for that reason
•·rmnot eonstitutionally be subjeeted to the provisions of the
fNlerH I 1\ ct. In any ease it is argued that the statute is not to
hr construed as applying to the state acting hi that capacity.
'' . . . 'l'he on]~- question we need consider is whether the
exereise of that power, in iYhatever capacity, must be in subordination to the power to regulate interstate commerce,
which has bren granted specifically to the national goYernment. The soverC?·gn power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal gm·ernmenl in the Constitution . . . .
"Crdifornia. br engaging in interstate commerce by rail.
liM.; :-:nb.ic'etP<1 itsrlf to the <'ommrrec pmwr, and is liable for
a Yiolation of the Safrt)' Appliance Act, as are other carrirrs.
nnless the statute is to be deemed inapplicable to state-ownr<l
railroads because it dors not specifically mention them. Tlw
federal Safrty Appliance Aet is rrmedial, to protect employees
and the public from injury because of defective railway
appliances, . . and to safeguard 1·nte1·state commerce itself
from obstruction and injury due to defective applianres upon
locomotiyes and cars nsed on the highways of interstate eom-
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merce, even
state . . . .

their individual

states
The same conUnited
4 Ann.Cas.
snpra, [293 U.S. 214
(55 S.Ct. 171, 79 J_~.Ed. 291) J. Similarly the Interstate Commerce Commission has regarded this and other state-owned
interstate rail carriers as subject to its
although
the Interstate Commerce Act does not in terms apply to
state-owned rail carriers. . . .
"Respondent invokes the canon of construction that a
sovereign is presumptively not intended to be bound by its
own statute unless named in it, . . . The presumption is an
aid to consistent construction of statutes of the enacting
sovereign when their purpose is in doubt, but it does not
require that the aim of a statute fairly to be inferred be
disregarded because not explicitly stated. . . . We can perceive no reason for extending it so as to exempt a business
can·ied on by a state from the otherwise applicable provis1'ons
of an act of Congress. all-embracing in scope and national 1'n
its pu.rpose. which is as capable of being obstructed by statr
as by individual action. l;anguage and objectiws so plain
are not to be tlnvarted by resort to a rule of construction
whose purpose is but to resolve doubts, and whose application
in the circumstances would be highly artificial. It was disrrgarded in Ohio v. H elve1·ing, supra, and Sotdh Carolina v.
TTniteil States. supra. See Heiner v. Colonial Trust Co., 275
TT.S. 2~2. n4. 2~fi r4R S.Ct. 65. 72 TJ.Ed. 2561." (Italics
added.)
Th0 forrg-oing is prr0isPly prrtlnf'nt in thr instant rasP.
'J'hr pnrposf' of tlw Railwa:-· Labor Act, Hkr thr Safrty Ap·
nlianrr Art, is to safrg-nard f'Ommer<w from obstruction. ( 4;)
TT.S.C.A. ~ l51a: Slocum v. Delaware L. &; W. R. Co .. 33!)
TT.S. 239 r7o S.Ct. 577. 94 LEd. 7951.) The purpose being
thr samr the application of th(~ acts should be the same. To
af'h ievr that purpoRe Cong-resR has provided means of assnringnracea blr labor rrlations whirh are rlearl:v appJicable when
thr state is a rarrirr. It has drclarrd the policy that the
pnrposr may be attained by collective bargaining and thr
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mediation board rather than the State Personnel Board. If by
federal mandate the state must
its inanimate equipment
it must also deal with its employees according to the
manner set forth in the Labor Act-a federal mandate.
lt has been held that the state is subject to the federal
Carriers'
Act
the Belt Line, which act
for the purpose of
revenue to pay for retirement
railroad
; that the federal statutory right to
receive retirement pay is binding upon the state. In State of
v. Anglim, 129 F.2d 455, that issue was presented.
There is no possible basis to distinguish that case from the
one at bar and the majority opinion makes no attempt to do
so. If payment of retirement to state employees of a state
earrier is controlled by the federal law although the state
is not named in the statute, certainly federal statutory provisions for collective bargaining which embrace wages and
working conditions are binding on the state. Retirement or
pension payments have always been considered as deferred
compensation or wages. Moreover, under the majority holding an anomalous situation is created. The payment of wages
before retirement would be controlled by state law while
subsequent wag·es (pension payments) would not. The analogy
between the cases compels the same result. Hence the majority
opinion violates the fundamental rule that a state court is
bound by the construction of a federal statute by a federal
eourt. (Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 [59 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed.
104] .)
In discussing a federal statute requiring consent of Congress for the construction of a dam on navigable streams, the
eourt said in United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 184
[55 S.Ct. 666, 79 L.Ed. 1371] : "These provisions unmistakably disclose definite intention on the part of Congress
effectively to safeguard rivers and other navigable waters
against the unauthorized erection therein of dams or other
structures for any purpose whatsoever. The plaintiff maintains that the restrictions so imposed apply only to work
undertaken by private parties. But no such intention is expressed, and 1ve are of opinion that none is implied. The
measures adopted for the enforcement of the prescribed rule
arc in general terms and purport to be applicable to all. No
Yalid reason has been or can be suggested why they should
apply to private persons and not to federal and state officers."
(Italics added.)
In State of Cal1:fornia v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 [64

and in answer to the daim that
)\ct did not
to the eity, stated that the issue was no
open at this late
States v. State
shall
su.pra, 2!17 U.S. 175.
is
much a matter
the
relations with
1t has
for the recovery of
railroad
suffered in the course of their
ment, applies to the Belt Line here involved. Maurice v.
J:Jtate of
43 Cal.App.2d 270
P.2d
.) No
attempt is made to distinguish that case and it cannot be done.
The act in question deals with the
and duties as be~
tween employer and employee the same as the
Labor
Act.
Finally, the identical
here
has been
decided. ln National Counc·il, etc. Union v.
56 .B'.Supp.
720, the court Jealt with whether patrolmen, hired by the
eity to patrol the harbor where the
operated a
were subject to the Hailway Labor Act. '!'he court held they
were not because they were not employees of the city as a
carrier, but said, citing the cases heretofore discussed: "Most
of the cases cited by Plaintiffs throw some light on the
question of coverage, but are not controlling. United States
v. State of California, ~97 U.S.
56 S.Ot.
80 L.Ed.
567; State of Cal·ifornia v. Latimer, 305 U.S. 257, 59 S.Ot.
166, 83 L.Ed. 159, and State of California v. Anglim, 9 Cir.,
129 J:<'.2d 455 of course, settle it that a r-ailroad, etc., owned by
the State or as here by a City wh·ich ·£san agency
the State
is, under certain circ·um:stances and perhaps generally speaking, within the coverage of the l Railway Labor] Act.''
(Jtalies added.) That case was affirmed on appeal (152 .B'.2d
500), the court not discussing the instant point but deciding
that whether the patrolmen were under the act must be de~
cided by the Interstate Commerce Commission. It should
be noted that there had been no determination here
that
commission.
As above seen, we have three unqualified instances in
which feder·al statutes dealing with the relationship between
the employe1· and employee in the raiJroad field have been
held to be applicable to the state with reference to the same
Belt Line Hailroad. Yet, in face of this wealth of authority,
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for
. No effort

sttpra, and
The act itself (Railway
It must be liberL. Ry. V.
A. F.
93 F.2d 340, cert.
!i4l1
S.Ct.
82 L.Ed. 1110] ), and it has been held that
it applies to the reeeiYer of a railroad (B1tr·ke v. Jlrlorphy, 109
11'.2d 572), although the receiver is subject to the control of
the
court.
The ~"<'Ollft argument of the majority that rates of pay and
\r<Jrldng eonditions of pu blir·. employees are traditionally a
mntt0r of Rtate Rtatntory and administrative regulation does
not shed an:· light on the subjeet. 'rhat argument applies with
eqnal foree to rights arising under provisions for retirement,
for injuries in the course of employment, and the safety requirements. They are no less traditionally regulated, as to
public employees, by statute and administrative regulation.
Neyertheless the eases hold, as above shown, that the fedocal
railroad ]a"·s control because of their effect upon interstate
<·ommerce.
That
has "consistently" excluded the state from
labor laws--~the third grouncl---is equally untenable. If that
is true, then it supports m~· position, for Congress thought
it mnst nse language excluding the state when it desired to
flo so. and it did. But it did not employ such language in
t hr Railway Labor Act and in tl1e field of employer-employee
relations in the railroad industry. and the courts have conheld that the federal legislation includes the state.
of thr history of the act-the fourth ground·-is wholl:·
It is said that it
no inctication that the state as a carrier was to be ineluded. But it
no indication to the contrary. True,
the act probabl.v arose out of cooperation between the unions
and
but no doubt the other federal railroad
la\YR \Yere similarly initiated.
The majority opinion sets forth the additional ground for
invalidating tlH' contract that it waR not approved b:· the
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of Finance of the State. There has been a substantial, although informal, approval by the state of the
eontract. It has been in force sinee 1942, and wages have
been paid according to the rates provided for therein since
that time. The Department of Finance knew of such payments
and gave implicit approval of them, for it "may
from
all such
of the State, financial and statistical ''"'"'\lP'""
duly verified, covering the period of each fiscal year." (Gov.
Code, § 13291.) And "may examine all records,
documents, accounts and all financial affairs of every agency mentioned in Section 13290." (Gov. Code, § 13293.) And it
''shall examine and expert the books of the several State
agencies, at least once in each year, and as often as the director
deems necessary.'' (Gov. Code, § 13294.) Hence it has exllmined the books and records of the Harbor Board, which
>vould include the collective bargaining contract and the payments to employees and has found them proper.
It is apparent that the last mentioned issue should not be
so lightly brushed aside. The majority holds that the Harbor
Board has the right to fix the pay of the employees subject
to the approval of the Department of Finance and also that
such employees are under civil service. If they are under
civil service it is very doubtful that the Legislature may provide that their rate of pay be fixed by the Harbor Board or
he subject to the approval of the Department of Finance.
The rateR of pay certainly relate to civil service for the
PerRmme] Board is empowered by statute to fix the rate of
pay. (Gov. Code, §§ 18500(1) (6), 18850 et seq.) The ConRtitution vests civil service matters exclusively in the State
Personnel Board. "Said board shall administer and enforce,
and is vested with all of the powers, duties, purposes, functions, and jurisdiction which are now or hereafter may be
vested in any other State officer or agency under, Chapter
!190 of the California Statutes of 1913 as amended or any and
all other laws relating to the State civil service as said lawR
rna~· now exist or may hereafter be enacted, amended or repealed h.v the IJegislaturr." (Cal. Const., art. XXIV,§ 3(a).)
I rreeondlable conflicts in state and federal law will necessarily result from the holding of the majority in this case.
Under its holding, State Belt Railroad employees are under
civil service. but their salary must be fixed by the Harbor
Board with the approval of the Department of Finance. This
holding is in conflict with both the Constitution of California
and the Gowrnment Code (see Cal. Const., art XXIV, § 3(a)
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§ 20000 et seq.) which
rates of pay, dismissals and the like are all within
of the State Personnel Board, and that there
a state l'("tircment system ·which embraces all civil service
All such
automatically become members
Go-:.

must

to it
as m
, the instant
are civil service
must be members of the state retirement
and contribute to it, but the majority opinion concedes
that they are subject to the federal Hailroad Employees'
Hetiremeut Act (see State
California v. A.nglim, 129 F.2d
455). There is no basis for splitting the complete system of
employer-employee relations between the state and its employees into parts, some of which are controlled by state
law and others by federal law. The majority holding leads
to absurd results. 'I'his would be avoided by a holding that
all of the federal statutes relating to railroad employeremployee relations apply to State Belt Hailroad employees.
'rhe trial court and the District Court of Appeal so held in
this case (State of CalifoTnia v. BrotheThood of Railroad
Trainmen, ( Cal.App.) 222 P.2d 27). That holding is ('minently sound.
T would, therefore, affirm the judgment.

'rhe opinion was modified to read as abo-:e printed and
r<cspondents' petition for a rehearing was denied ,Tnly 19,
1951. Carter, .T., voted for a rehearing.

